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AbstrAct
The last 30 years in the history of  international investment law witnessed the 
emergence of  investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) as the definitive me-
thod for the resolution of  investment disputes, and the expanding role of  the 
investor in the same. Investment dispute settlement has become largely syno-
nymous with a system that involves an investor, often private entity, in interna-
tional arbitration against its host state. States, in this same setting, are relegated 
to the role of  respondent. But despite the predominant role of  the investor, 
some mechanisms involving both states (host state and home state of  the 
investor) do exist. Some of  these mechanisms, such as state-state dispute set-
tlement and binding interpretations, have been used for years. Others, such as 
national contact points or ombudsmen, are newer. As investment law enters a 
new era of  reflection with the functioning of  the current ISDS machinery at 
its centre, some of  the efforts at reforming international investment law focus 
on enhancing the role of  the state in investment dispute settlement and add 
to the popularity of  some of  these mechanisms. The article critically explores 
three ‘soft’ non-adjudicatory approaches to the prevention or resolution of  
investment disputes that belong to the sphere of  state-to-state procedures and 
have gained currency in recent years: joint interpretive statements, including 
subsequent agreement or practice under general public international law and 
clarifications through diplomatic notes and periodic review of  treaty content; 
filter mechanisms; and focal points or ombudsmen.
Keywords: non-adjudicatory State-State mechanism; joint interpretations; 
filters; focal points
resumo
Os últimos 30 anos na história do direito de investimento internacional 
testemunharam o surgimento da solução de conflito entre investidores e 
Estados como o método para a resolução de conflitos de investimento e 
o papel crescente do investidor no mesmo. A resolução de litígios de in-
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vestimento tornou-se em grande parte sinônimo de um 
sistema que envolve um investidor, muitas vezes entida-
de privada, num processo de arbitragem internacional 
contra o seu Estado anfitrião. Os Estados, neste mesmo 
cenário, são relegados ao papel do reu. Mas, apesar do 
papel predominante do investidor, alguns mecanismos 
envolvendo ambos os Estados (Estado anfitrião e Es-
tado de origem do investidor) existem. Alguns desses 
mecanismos, como a resolução de litígios entre Estados 
e as interpretações vinculativas, foram usados há anos. 
Outros, como os Pontos de contato nacionais ou o Om-
budsman, são mais novos. Como o direito dos investi-
mentos entra em uma nova era de reflexão com o fun-
cionamento do atual sistema de resolução de disputas 
no seu centro, alguns dos esforços de reforma interna-
cional são visíveis, concentrando-se no papel crescente 
do Estado na resolução de disputa, aumentando assim 
a popularidade de alguns desses mecanismos. O artigo 
explora criticamente três abordagens ‘não-contenciosas’ 
para a prevenção ou a resolução de disputas de investi-
mento que pertencem à esfera de procedimentos Esta-
do-Estado que ganharam atenção nos últimos anos: as 
declarações interpretativas conjuntas, incluindo acordo 
ou prática subsequente regido pelo direito internacional 
público e esclarecimentos através de notas diplomáticas 
e revisão periódica do conteúdo dos tratados; mecanis-
mos de filtragem; e pontos focais ou ombudsman.
Palavras-chave: resolução não contenciosa de dispu-
tas; interpretação conjunta; filtros; pontos focais
1. IntroductIon
The last 30 years in the history of  international in-
vestment law witnessed the emergence of  investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) as the definitive method for 
the resolution of  investment disputes, and the expan-
ding role of  the investor in the same. Investment dis-
pute settlement has become largely synonymous with 
a system that involves an investor, often private entity, 
in international arbitration against its host state. States, 
in this same setting, are relegated to the role of  respon-
dent. But despite the predominant role of  the investor, 
some mechanisms involving both states (host state and 
home state of  the investor) do exist. Some of  these me-
chanisms, such as state-state dispute settlement and bin-
ding interpretations, have been used for years. Others, 
such as national contact points or ombudsmen, are 
newer. As investment law enters a new era of  reflection1 
with the functioning of  the current ISDS machinery at 
its centre, some of  the efforts at reforming internatio-
nal investment law focus on enhancing the role of  the 
state in investment dispute settlement and add to the 
popularity of  some of  these mechanisms. 
The purpose of  the present article is to critically ex-
plore three of  these complementary or alternative ap-
proaches to the prevention or resolution of  investment 
disputes that belong to the sphere of  state-to-state pro-
cedures and have gained currency in recent years. All 
three mechanisms are ‘soft’ non-adjudicatory means by 
which states parties to a treaty reserve for themselves 
a role in the interpretation or application of  an invest-
ment treaty in investment dispute settlement or in dispu-
te prevention. These means often require consultations 
between the parties, although consultations are not exa-
mined as a standalone mechanism in the present contri-
bution. The article is structured as follows. The first part 
focuses on interpretive statements issued jointly by the 
contracting parties. These include subsequent agreement 
or practice under general public international law, bin-
ding interpretations provided for in the treaty text, other 
interpretations, and clarifications through diplomatic 
notes and periodic review of  treaty content. The second 
part examines filter mechanisms. The third part turns to 
focal points or ombudsmen. A final section concludes. 
2. JoInt InterpretIve stAtements 
‘Masters’ of  their treaties,2 the contracting parties are 
seen as the treaties’ ‘authoritative’ interpreters or at least 
as capable of  providing ‘authentic’ means of  interpre-
tation. This is true to some extent under general public 
international law and under certain investment treaty 
provisions that expressly allow the contracting parties to 
assume a concrete role in the interpretation of  their trea-
ties. Four of  these mechanisms will be explored here: 
subsequent agreement or practice under general public 
international law, binding interpretive statements on the 
basis of  treaty provisions, other interpretive statements 
not expressly provided for by the applicable investment 
1  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International 
Investment Governance, 2015, New York and Geneva, UN, p. 120.
2  UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note No. 3: Interpretation of  IIAs: What 
States Can Do, 2011, p. 4.
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treaty as such, and clarifications through diplomatic no-
tes and periodic review of  treaty content.
2.1. Subsequent agreement or practice under 
general public international law
Under certain conditions, states can give authoritative 
interpretations of  their treaties on the basis of  general 
public international law. Article 31(3)(a) and (b) of  the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (VCLT) pro-
vides that treaty interpretation shall take into account, 
together with the context ‘[a]ny subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of  the 
treaty or the application of  its provisions’ and ‘[a]ny sub-
sequent practice in the application of  the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of  the parties regarding its 
interpretation’.3  According to the International Law 
Commission (ILC), ‘an agreement as to the interpreta-
tion of  a provision reached after the conclusion of  the 
treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the par-
ties which must be read into the treaty for purposes of  
its interpretation’.4 The Report of  the International Law 
Commission on its sixty-fifth session in 2013 established:
‘By describing subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice under article 31(3)(a) and 
(b) as “authentic” means of  interpretation the 
Commission recognizes that the common will of  
the parties, from which any treaty results, possesses 
a specific authority regarding the identification 
of  the meaning of  the treaty, even after the 
conclusion of  the treaty. The Vienna Convention 
thereby accords the parties to a treaty a role which 
may be uncommon for the interpretation of  legal 
instruments in some domestic legal systems.’5
The ILC has warned that Article 31(3) of  the VCLT 
requires that subsequent agreement and practice be 
taken into account, but that does not necessarily imply 
that these means ‘possess a conclusive, or legally bin-
ding, effect’; in other words, they do not override all 
other means of  interpretation.6 By contrast, when ‘the 
parties consider the interpretation to be binding upon 
3  On the distinction between ‘subsequent agreement’ and ‘subse-
quent practice’, see ILC, Report of  the International Law Commis-
sion, Sixty-fifth session (6 May–7 June and 8 July–9 August 2013), 
UN Doc A/68/10 (2013), p. 21-24.
4 ILC, Yearbook of  the International Law Commission 1966, Vol. II 
221, [14], UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l.
5  ILC, Report of  the International Law Commission, Sixty-fifth 
session(6 May–7 June and 8 July–9 August 2013), UN Doc A/68/10 
(2013), p. 21.
6 Ibid., p. 21.
them’, subsequent agreements and practice regarding 
the interpretation of  a treaty must be conclusive.7 Such 
possibility for binding or conclusive effect is clear in 
cases, such as in Article 1131, paragraph 2, of  the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where the 
treaty itself  provides for it.8 Article 1131 of  NAFTA 
will be discussed in the following section.
The contracting parties’ ability to provide authori-
tative means of  interpretation in relation to their trea-
ties has also been addressed by the Permanent Court 
of  International Justice (PCIJ) and by the International 
Court of  Justice (ICJ). The PCIJ has held that ‘[i]t is an 
established principle that the right of  giving an authori-
tative interpretation of  a legal rule belongs solely to the 
person or body who has power to modify or suppress 
it’.9  In its turn, the International Court of  Justice (ICJ) 
has repeatedly made reference to or sought to establish 
the presence of  the parties’ subsequent agreement or 
practice as to the interpretation of  a treaty.10
2.2. Binding joint interpretations on the basis of 
treaty provisions
Binding party interpretations on the basis of  con-
crete investment treaty provisions, initially encounte-
red in North American investment treaty practice but 
now becoming more widespread, allow for interpretive 
statements either by the parties or by a joint commis-
sion made up by representatives of  the contracting par-
ties that are binding on a tribunal. Probably the most 
famous of  these provisions is Article 1131, paragraph 
2, of  NAFTA which has formed the basis of  several 
joint statements by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
(FTC).11 The most notable use of  the article took place 
in 2001, when the NAFTA FTC issued an interpretive 
7 Ibid., p. 22.
8 Ibid., p. 22.
9  Delimitation of  the Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier (Question 
of  Jaworzina), Advisory Opinion, (1923) PCIJ Series B no 8.
10  E.g. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judg-
ment, ICJ Reports 1994, p. 6, para. 66; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bot-
swana/Namibia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 1045, paras 48, 
63; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesial-
Malaysia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 625, paras 37, 61; Whal-
ing in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2014, p. 226, para. 83; Maritime Delimitation 
in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, 2 February 2017, 
para. 64. 
11  See http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/NAFTA/NAFTA_e.
ASP#Understanding. 
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statement that equated fair and equitable treatment, as 
enshrined in Article 1105 of  NAFTA, with the minimum 
standard of  the treatment of  aliens under customary in-
ternational law.12 This interpretation is no less notorious 
because when it was issued, in an ongoing dispute, the 
Pope & Talbot tribunal had already determined that ‘the 
requirement to accord NAFTA investors fair and equita-
ble treatment was independent of, not subsumed by the 
requirement to accord them treatment required by inter-
national law’. As a consequence of  the FTC interpretive 
statement, the tribunal was required to recant. 
Article 1131, paragraph 2, of  NAFTA has been emu-
lated in subsequent US and Canadian treaty practice.13 
An equivalent provision exists in the new international 
investment treaties of  the European Union, but also in 
investment treaties concluded outside these regions. For 
instance, the EU-Singapore free trade agreement (FTA) 
provides:
‘Where serious concerns arise as regards issues of  
interpretation which may affect matters relating to 
this Chapter, the Trade Committee […] may adopt 
interpretations of  provisions of  this Agreement. 
An interpretation adopted by the Trade Committee 
shall be binding on a tribunal deciding on a claim 
[…], and any award shall be consistent with that 
decision. The Trade Committee may decide that 
an interpretation shall have binding effect from a 
specific date.’ 14
Outside the EU, an example comes from the Korea-
-New Zealand FTA. This 2015 treaty provides that a tri-
bunal, on the request of  the respondent, shall ‘request a 
joint interpretation of  the Joint Commission of  any pro-
vision of  this Agreement that is in issue in a dispute’.15 
The Joint Commission shall submit to the tribunal any 
joint decision on the interpretation of  the agreement 
within 60 days.16 This joint decision will be binding on 
the tribunal and ‘any award must be consistent with that 
joint decision’.17 If  the Joint Commission fails to make a 
decision within 60 days, the issue reverts to the tribunal 
12 NAFTA, Free Trade Commission Clarifications Related to 
NAFTA Chapter 11, 31 July 2001, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
nafta/chap11interp.pdf.
13  E.g. Article 30(3) of  the US Model BIT (2012) and Article 
33(1) of  the Canadian Model BIT (version of  2012).
14  Article 9.19(3) of  the EU-Singapore free trade agreement 
(FTA). For another example, see Articles 8.31(3) and 26.3(2) of  
the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA).
15  Article 10.25(1) of  the Korea-Nez Zealand FTA (2015).
16  Article 10.25(1) of  the Korea-Nez Zealand FTA (2015).
17  Articles 10.25(2) and 10.28 (2) of  the Korea-Nez Zealand FTA 
(2015).
for determination.18 Similarly, Russia’s recent Regulation 
on Entering into International Treaties on the Encou-
ragement and Mutual Protection of  Investments, which 
replaces the Russian Model BIT,19 recommends that ar-
bitration proceedings not be commenced or, if  commen-
ced, be suspended, pending consultations between the 
contracting parties in order to render a binding interpreta-
tion of  investment treaty provisions raised in a dispute.20 
Provisions on binding interpretive statements sometimes 
allow a disputing party to request the tribunal to submit to 
the contracting parties its proposed decision or award for 
comments concerning any of  its aspects.21 
Binding ‘interpretations’ are also provided for in re-
lation to specific measures, notably those relating to ta-
xation and prudential measures. The relevant provisions 
typically apply when an exception or other defence is 
invoked by the host state, in which case the competent 
tax or financial authorities22 or the contracting parties23 
need to determine whether the arguments of  the host 
state constitute a valid defence. This type of  procedure 
for binding determinations, called ‘filter’, could be con-
sidered as a joint interpretation mechanism. However, in 
contrast with joint interpretations discussed here, filters 
tend to concern concrete application of  the law in a gi-
ven situation. Filters are examined below in Section III. 
2.3. Interpretive statements not expressly 
provided for as such in the treaty
Joint interpretations are also possible when not di-
rectly provided for in a treaty as such. The EU-Cana-
da Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) provides that a tribunal seised of  a dispute shall 
accept or, following consultation with the disputing par-
ties, may invite oral or written submissions from the non-
-disputing contracting party regarding the interpretation 
the agreement. Although this provision is focused on the 
18  Article 10.25(2) of  the Korea-Nez Zealand FTA (2015).
19  See Foreign direct investment after Yukos Shareholders v Rus-
sia, Norton Rose Fulbright, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
knowledge/publications/148974/russias-new-guidelines-on-fu-
ture-bilateral-investment-treaties. 
20  See http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/2000149/
russia. 
21  Article 28(9)(a) of  the US Model BIT (2012). However, in this 
case, the comments are not binding but need only be considered.
22  E.g. Article 2103(6) of  the NAFTA; Article 21(5)(b) of  the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT); Article 21(2) of  the US Model BIT 
(2012); Article 14(7) of  the Canadian Model BIT (version of  2012).
23  Article 28.7 of  CETA.
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non-disputing party, when applied the result is that both 
contracting parties will have provided their opinion on 
the interpretation of  the treaty. CETA further provides 
that its Committee on Services and Investment ‘shall pro-
vide a forum for the Parties to consult’ on issues related 
to the treaty’s investment chapter.24 Properly speaking, 
the latter provision concerns consultations between the 
parties. Consultations can end up in a joint statement that 
a tribunal takes into account. 
Such an example is offered by the CME v. the Czech 
Republic case brought on the basis of  the intra-EU BIT 
signed between the Czech Republic and the Netherlands 
in 1991.25 This treaty establishes that a contracting par-
ty may propose to the other party consultations ‘on any 
matter concerning the interpretation or application of  
the Agreement’.26 The provision further enjoins the other 
contracting party to give ‘sympathetic consideration’ to 
the request and to afford ‘adequate opportunity’ for the 
consultation.27 Pursuant to this provision, in CME v. the 
Czech Republic, the contracting parties adopted a ‘common 
position’, to which the tribunal referred in the final award.28 
Another example is offered by the Railroad Develo-
pment v. Guatemala dispute brought on the basis of  the 
US-Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (US-
-DR-CAFTA).29 Like CETA, this agreement allows a 
non-disputing contracting party to make oral and writ-
ten submissions to a tribunal regarding the interpreta-
tion of  the agreement.30 In Railroad Development v. Gua-
temala, the tribunal had to decide on the content of  fair 
and equitable treatment and the minimum standard of  
treatment, provided for in Article 10.5 of  the US-DR-
-CAFTA. Three non-disputing contracting parties, the 
United States, El Salvador and Honduras, filed submis-
sions on the matter arguing in favour of  a restrictive 
interpretation of  Article 10.5 of  the US-DR-CAFTA.31 
While taking their submissions into account, the tribu-
nal found that the minimum standard of  treatment has 
evolved since the Neer formulation, and rejected the su-
24  Article 8.44 of  the CETA.
25  CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v the Czech Re-
public, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14 March 2003, paras 87, 437.
26  Article 9 of  the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT.
27  Ibid.
28  CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v the Czech Re-
public, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14 March 2003, paras 87, 437.
29  Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v Guatemala, IC-
SID Case No ARB/07/23, Award, 29 June 2012.
30  Article 10.20(2) of  the US-DR-CAFTA.
31  Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v Guatemala, IC-
SID Case No ARB/07/23, Award, 29 June 2012, paras 207–211.
ggestion that it should be construed narrowly.32
Even outside the context of  a dispute or after a 
dispute has been resolved, states can make their views 
known in order to influence future interpretations.33 
After the tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan had delivered its 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction,34 the Swiss 
authorities addressed a letter to the Secretariat of  the 
International Centre for Settlement of  Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) expressing their concern about the 
tribunal’s interpretation of  the investment treaty’s um-
brella clause in Article 11 of  the applicable BIT. The 
Swiss authorities criticised the tribunal for not finding it 
necessary to enquire about the Swiss authorities’ inter-
pretation of  Article 11 of  the BIT, while Pakistan (the 
respondent) was indeed asked to provide its views. The 
Swiss authorities were particularly critical, especially sin-
ce the tribunal had attached importance to the contrac-
ting parties’ intentions.35 The Swiss authorities further 
declared that they were ‘alarmed’ about the tribunal’s 
interpretation of  the treaty’s umbrella clause, interpreta-
tion which run counter to Switzerland’s intention when 
concluding the BIT.36 The letter went on to explain the 
Swiss interpretation of  the umbrella clause.37 While this 
reaction in relation to SGS v. Pakistan does not reflect 
a state-state procedure, it could serve as guidance for 
future tribunals to invite the two contracting parties to 
32  Lars Markert and Catharine Titi, States Strike Back – Old and 
New ways for Host States to Defend against Investment Arbitra-
tions, in Andrea Bjorklund (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment 
Law & Policy 2013-2014, 2015, OUP, p. 416.
33  Lars Markert and Catharine Titi, States Strike Back – Old and 
New ways for Host States to Defend against Investment Arbitra-
tions, in Andrea Bjorklund (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment 
Law & Policy 2013-2014, 2015, OUP, p. 417.
34 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID 
Case No ARB/01/13, Decision on Objection to  Jurisdiction, 6 Au-
gust 2003.
35  E.g. see the tribunal’s statement on the need for ‘[c]lear and 
convincing evidence that such was indeed the shared intent of  the 
Contracting Parties to the Swiss-Pakistan Investment Protection 
Treaty in incorporating Article 11 in the BIT’ (SGS Société Géné-
rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/01/13, 
Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 167).
36  Note on the Interpretation of  Article 11 of  the BIT be-
tween Switzerland and Pakistan in the light of  the Decision of  
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of  ICSID in Case No. 
ARB/01/13 SGS Société Générale, attached to the Letter of  the 
Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs to the ICSID Deputy-Sec-
retary General dated 1 October 2003, cited in Emmanuel Gaillard, 
Investment treaty arbitration and jurisdiction over contract claims—
the SGS cases considered’ in Todd Weiler (ed.), International Invest-
ment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilat-
eral Treaties and Customary International Law, 2005, p. 341–342.
37  Ibid.
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express their views when determining their original in-
tentions.38
2.4. Clarifications through diplomatic notes and 
periodic reviews of treaty content
An authentic interpretation must not constitute a 
treaty amendment. International investment agreements 
include specific provisions on amendment, which are 
beyond the scope of  the present to explore. However, the 
two types of  interpretive statements examined in this sec-
tion are related to treaty amendment either because they 
borrow means that can also be used for treaty amend-
ment (diplomatic notes) or because they can lead to treaty 
amendment (regular reviews of  treaty content). 
The exchange of  diplomatic notes to amend or 
clarify the content of  an investment treaty is common 
practice. The United States exchanged diplomatic notes 
with eight new EU member states (Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, 
and Slovakia) before their accession to the Union, in 
order to clarify some aspects of  their respective trea-
ties.39 Through diplomatic notes to UK bilateral invest-
ment treaties the contracting parties agreed to extend 
the treaties’ application to ‘the Bailiwicks of  Jersey and 
Guernsey and the Isle of  Man’.40 An often-discussed 
case concerns the exchange of  diplomatic notes be-
tween Argentina and Panama to clarify the scope of  the 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause in the Argentina-
-Panama BIT. Following the Decision on Jurisdiction in 
Siemens v Argentina,41 in which the tribunal had allowed 
application of  the MFN clause to the treaty’s dispute 
settlement provisions, the contracting parties exchan-
ged diplomatic notes which contained an ‘interpretati-
38  Lars Markert and Catharine Titi, States Strike Back – Old and 
New ways for Host States to Defend against Investment Arbitra-
tions, in Andrea Bjorklund (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment 
Law & Policy 2013-2014, 2015, OUP, p. 417.
39  See Lise Johnson and Merim Razbaeva, State Control over 
Interpretation of  Investment Treaties, April 2014, http://ccsi.co-
lumbia.edu/files/2014/04/State_control_over_treaty_interpreta-
tion_FINAL-April-5_2014.pdf, p. 6. 
40  See Investment Treaty Arbitration 2016: England and Wales 
– Overview of  investment treaty programme, Global Arbitration 
Review http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/2000108/
england-&-wales. For another example, see Exchange of  Notes 
between the UK and Paraguay amending the 1981 UK-Uruguay 
BIT, http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/
PAR_UK_1993.pdf.  
41  Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004.
ve declaration’ to the effect that the BIT’s MFN clause 
does not extend to dispute settlement clauses.42 Sub-
sequently, Argentina failed to unilaterally convince the 
tribunal in National Grid v. Argentina, that the interpreta-
tion adopted in the Argentina-Panama diplomatic notes 
should apply to the Argentina-UK BIT. The tribunal 
noted that Argentina had not adopted similar joint in-
terpretations of  the MFN clause in the more than 50 
other bilateral investment treaties it has concluded with 
other states.43 The tribunal further commented:
‘While it is possible to conclude from the UK 
investment treaty practice contemporaneous with the 
conclusion of  the Treaty that the UK understood 
the MFN clause to extend to dispute resolution, 
no definite conclusion can be reached regarding 
the Argentine Republic’s position at that time. 
Therefore, the review of  the treaty practice of  
the State parties to the Treaty with regard to their 
common intent is inconclusive.’ 44
Although it is standard UK treaty practice to render 
the MFN clause applicable to ISDS provisions,45 in casu 
the tribunal’s argument that the MFN clause was un-
derstood to apply to the treaty’s dispute settlement clau-
se at the time the treaty was concluded, is not relevant to 
the counterargument that that may have been contrary 
subsequent agreement or practice.
A final mechanism for joint treaty interpretations 
considered here is periodic review of  treaty provisions 
by the parties, which is sometimes expressly included in 
investment treaties. Article 8.10, paragraph 3, of  CETA 
establishes:
‘The Parties shall regularly, or upon request of  a 
Party, review the content of  the obligation to provide 
fair and equitable treatment. The Committee on 
Services and Investment, established under Article 
26.2.1(b) (Specialised committees), may develop 
recommendations in this regard and submit them 
to the CETA Joint Committee for decision.’
42  For an account, see National Grid v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of  20 June 2006, para. 85.
43  Ibid., para. 85.
44  Ibid., para. 85, emphasis added.
45  E.g. Article 3(3) of  the UK Model BIT (2008), see also Arti-
cle 11. See also, for instance, respective Articles 3(3) and 11 of  the 
BITs between the UK and Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Georgia, 
Honduras, Kazakhstan, Laos, Pakistan, Slovenia, South Africa, Ton-
ga, Turkmenistan and Uganda, and respective Articles 3(4) and 10 
UK-Chile BIT and UK-Lebanon BIT; see also Articles 3(3) and 10A 
UK-Paraguay BIT (1981) as amended by the Exchange of  Notes 
upon a proposal by Paraguay. Contrast Article III(2) UK-Colombia 
BIT (2010), which in all appearances follows extensively Colombia’s 
Model BIT.
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This provision is complemented by Article 8.44, pa-
ragraph 3, of  CETA which provides among others that 
the Committee on Services and Investment may, upon 
agreement of  the contracting parties, ‘recommend to 
the CETA Joint Committee the adoption of  any further 
elements of  the fair and equitable treatment obligation’. 
In addition, the Committee on Services and Investment 
may ‘adopt and amend rules supplementing the appli-
cable dispute settlement rules, and amend the applica-
ble rules on transparency’.46 The relevant subparagraph 
adds that such rules and amendments are binding on 
a tribunal established under CETA’s section on ‘Reso-
lution of  investment disputes between investors and 
states’.47 Similar provisions exist in other EU internatio-
nal investment agreements.48
3. fIlter mechAnIsms
The ‘filter’ to ISDS is a mechanism which allows 
contracting parties to intervene in investment dispute 
settlement that involves sensitive measures and to de-
termine whether these have been taken for the stated 
reasons.49 In reality, where a filter exists, it is up to the 
parties to decide whether a treaty exception applies. 
With filters the investor-state tribunal seised of  a dis-
pute where the contested issue arises may not proceed 
until the parties, the parties’ financial, tax, etc. authori-
ties, or a state-state tribunal have delivered their report 
or decision. The filter mechanism resembles provisions 
on joint interpretations by the parties, insomuch as 
the decision on a particular question is remitted to the 
parties. Seen in this light, filter mechanisms could be 
deemed to form a subcategory of  joint interpretations. 
However, filters concern the concrete application rather 
than interpretation of  a given rule. With filters, what 
is needed is not interpretation of  a treaty provision in 
abstracto, such as in order to determine whether fair and 
46  Article 8.44(3) of  CETA.
47  Ibid.
48  E.g. see Article 9.30(2) of  the EU-Singapore FTA.
49  This is how the term is used in the present. Filters are some-
times also understood to involve joint binding interpretations of  the 
parties and procedures that aim to divert claims from investor-state 
dispute settlement, such as a requirement to exhaust local remedies. 
See Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, and Jesse Coleman, International 
Investment Agreements, 2014: A Review of  Trends and New Ap-
proaches, in Andrea Bjorklund (ed.) Yearbook on International Invest-
ment Law & Policy 2014-2015, 2016, p. 44-47.
equitable treatment is equated to the minimum standard 
of  treatment, but determination of  whether a particular 
exception or defence applies. For this reason, in con-
trast with joint interpretations, such as interpretations 
by the NAFTA FTC, that are binding on tribunals for 
all subsequent cases,50 the determination of  an issue ac-
cording to a filter mechanism applies in principle only 
to the case at hand and cannot bind future tribunals.
Filters have been interpreted as forming part of  
states’ endeavours to increasingly narrow the scope for 
arbitral review of  host state policies.51 The European 
Commission’s 2014 Public consultation on modalities 
for investment protection and ISDS in TTIP referred 
to the filter mechanism in the following terms (limited 
to prudential measures): 
‘[S]ome investment agreements have introduced 
mechanisms which grant the regulators of  the Parties 
to the agreement the possibility to intervene (through 
a so-called “filter” to ISDS) in particular ISDS cases 
that involve measures ostensibly taken for prudential 
reasons. The mechanism enables the Parties to decide 
whether a measure is indeed taken for prudential 
reasons, and thus if  the impact on the investor 
concerned is justified. On this basis, the Parties may 
therefore agree that a claim should not proceed.’52
NAFTA provides an early example of  a filter me-
chanism. Article 1415 (Investment Disputes in Financial Ser-
vices) provides:
‘1. Where an investor of  another Party submits a 
claim […] and the disputing Party invokes Article 
1410 [exceptions for prudential reasons], on request 
of  the disputing Party, the Tribunal shall refer the 
matter in writing to the Committee for a decision. 
The Tribunal may not proceed pending receipt of  a 
decision or report under this Article.
2. In a referral pursuant to paragraph 1, the 
Committee shall decide the issue of  whether and to 
what extent Article 1410 [exceptions for prudential 
reasons] is a valid defense to the claim of  the 
investor. The Committee shall transmit a copy of  
its decision to the Tribunal and to the Commission. 
The decision shall be binding on the Tribunal.
3. Where the Committee has not decided the issue 
within 60 days […], the disputing Party or the Party of  
50  E.g. see Article 1131(2) of  NAFTA (‘An interpretation by the 
Commission of  a provision of  this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal 
established under this Section’). 
51  Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, and Jesse Coleman, International 
Investment Agreements, 2014: A Review of  Trends and New Ap-
proaches, in Andrea Bjorklund (ed.) Yearbook on International Invest-
ment Law & Policy 2014-2015, 2016, p. 44.
52  See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tra-
doc_152280.pdf. 
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the disputing investor may request the establishment 
of  an arbitral panel under Article 2008 (Request for 
an Arbitral Panel). The panel […] shall transmit its 
final report to the Committee and to the Tribunal. 
The report shall be binding on the Tribunal. […]’
A similar provision exists in the US Model BIT,53 
in the Canadian Model BIT,54 and more recently a fil-
ter mechanism in relation to financial services measures 
was inserted in CETA. CETA’s Chapter 13 on Financial 
services applies to investment in financial institutions in 
the territory of  the host state. Article 13.16 provides 
an exception for prudential measures. It states that the 
agreement ‘does not prevent a Party from adopting or 
maintaining reasonable measures for prudential rea-
sons’, including for the protection of  investors, the 
maintenance of  the safety, soundness, integrity, or fi-
nancial responsibility of  a financial institution, and en-
suring the integrity and stability of  a contracting party’s 
financial system.55 Article 13.21 states that a respondent 
may refer the matter to the Financial Services Commit-
tee for a determination of  whether, and if  so to what 
extent, the exception is ‘a valid defence to the claim’.56 
In case of  such a referral, the Financial Services Com-
mittee or the CETA Joint Committee, as the case may 
be, may jointly determine the issue. If  a tribunal has 
been constituted, the committee shall transmit to it a 
copy of  the joint determination. If  the joint determi-
nation concludes that the exception is ‘a valid defence 
to all parts of  the claim in their entirety, the investor is 
deemed to have withdrawn its claim and the procee-
dings are discontinued’.57 The joint determination that 
the exception is a valid defence to part of  the claim 
will be binding on the tribunal.58 Application of  these 
provisions is further clarified in Annex 13-B (Unders-
tanding on the application of  art 13.16.1 and 13.21). Similar 
provisions are included in other recent Canadian IIAs. 
CETA’s filter mechanism for prudential measures has 
been described as ‘a significant development of  the fil-
ter mechanism found in NAFTA’.59 
UNCTAD’s 2015 World Investment Report focused its 
53  Article 20 of  the US Model BIT (2012).
54  Article 23(3) of  the Canadian Model BIT (version of  2012).
55  Article 13.16(1) of  CETA.
56  Article 13.21(3) of  CETA.
57  Article 13.21(4) of  CETA.
58  Article 13.21(4) of  CETA.
59  Andrew Lang and Caitlin Conyers, Financial Services in EU 
Trade Agreements, Study for the European Parliament, 2014, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/536300/
IPOL_STU(2014)536300_EN.pdf.
definition of  filters on a more specific type of  provi-
sion. It equated the filter mechanism with an option 
found in the bilateral investment treaty between Canada 
and China of  2012.60 The BIT in question contains a 
curious provision. According to this, where an investor 
files a claim to dispute settlement and the respondent 
invokes an exception for prudential measures, the tri-
bunal must seek a ‘report’ from the contracting parties 
on this issue. The tribunal cannot proceed ‘pending 
receipt of  such a report or of  a decision of  a State-
-State arbitral tribunal, should such a State-State arbitral 
tribunal be established’.61 Following this request for a 
report, the contracting parties’ financial services autho-
rities engage in consultations, which may end in a joint 
report that the prudential exception is a valid defence to 
the investor’s claim. Such a joint report shall be binding 
on the investment tribunal.62 So far, there is nothing 
astonishing about this provision. Its particularity is in-
troduced immediately afterwards. In the case where the 
parties’ financial services authorities fail to reach a joint 
decision on the issue of  whether the prudential excep-
tion is a valid defence to the investor’s claim:
‘the issue shall, within 30 days, be referred by either of  
the Contracting Parties to a State-State arbitral tribunal 
[…]. The decision of  the State-State arbitral tribunal 
shall be transmitted to the investor-State tribunal, and 
shall be binding on the investor-State tribunal.’63
This renvoi to state-to-state arbitration is remarkable, 
especially given the phrasing of  the provision and the 
questions it leaves open. The issue shall be referred to a 
state-to-state tribunal by one of  the contracting parties, 
but what if  the contracting parties do not refer the issue? 
Would in that case the investor-state tribunal not be able 
to deal with the case, or, after the lapse of  30 days of  
inaction, would it consider that it is able to claim the 
case back? Another particularity is that this provision 
goes beyond a mere state-to-state mechanism for the 
resolution of  the issue and invites the initiation of  state-
-to-state dispute settlement on the question of  applica-
tion of  an exception. UNCTAD has viewed state-state 
dispute settlement as more suitable for ‘sensitive issues 
of  systemic importance, such as those relating to the 
integrity and stability of  the financial system, the global 
60  See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming Interna-
tional Investment Governance, 2015, New York and Geneva, UN, p. 149.
61  Article 20(2)(a) of  the Canada-China BIT (2012).
62  Article 20(2)(b) of  the Canada-China BIT (2012).
63  Article 20(2)(c) of  the Canada-China BIT (2012), emphasis 
added.
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system of  international tax relations, or public health’.64 
Nonetheless, investor-state dispute settlement was intro-
duced in order to depoliticise investment disputes,65 and 
the provision in question encourages, essentially requi-
res, the initiation of  interstate arbitration.
Canada appears to have refined this type of  filter 
since its 2012 BIT with China. Although in its newer 
treaties the issue is still to be submitted to state-state dis-
pute settlement, provision is made in case that no deci-
sion shall be made. According to the 2016 Canada-Hong 
Kong BIT, at the request of  a contracting party, where 
an investor submits a claim to arbitration and the res-
pondent invokes certain treaty exceptions, the tribunal 
shall request a report from the parties ‘on the issue of  
whether and to what extent the invoked paragraph is a 
valid defence to the claim of  the investor’.66 The tribunal 
cannot proceed, while receipt of  this report is pending.67 
In the event that the parties cannot agree, they shall sub-
mit the issue to interstate arbitration, and the interstate 
tribunal shall prepare the report. The latter will be bin-
ding on the investor-state tribunal.68 If  no request for 
the constitution of  an interstate tribunal has been made 
and no report has been received by the investor-state 
tribunal within 70 days of  the referral, the investor-state 
tribunal may decide the matter.69 Similar procedures are 
included in other recent Canadian BITs.70
Filter mechanisms are also common for taxation 
measures. The Canadian Model BIT (version of  2012) 
provides: 
‘[…] An investor may not make a claim under 
paragraph 5 unless […] six months after receiving 
notification of  the claim by the investor, the 
taxation authorities of  the Parties fail to reach a joint 
determination that, in the case of  subparagraph 5(a), 
the measure does not contravene that agreement, or 
in the case of  subparagraph 5(b), the measure in 
question is not an expropriation.
64  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International 
Investment Governance, 2015, New York and Geneva, UN, p. 149.
65  Catharine Titi, Are Investment Tribunals Adjudicating Politi-
cal Disputes? Some reflections on the repoliticization of  investment 
disputes and (new) forms of  diplomatic protection, Journal of Interna-
tional Arbitration 32 (3), 2015, p. 263, with citations.
66  Article 22(3) of  the Canada-Hong Kong BIT (2016).
67  Article 22(3) of  the Canada-Hong Kong BIT (2016).
68  Article 22(4) of  the Canada-Hong Kong BIT (2016).
69  Article 22(5) of  the Canada-Hong Kong BIT (2016).
70  E.g. Article 22(3) of  the Canada-Côte d’Ivoire BIT (2015); 
Article 24(3) of  the Burkina Faso-Canada BIT (2015); Article 23(3) 
of  the Canada-Guinea BIT (2015); Article 22(3) of  the Canada-
Mongolia BIT (2016).
If, in connection with a claim by an investor of  
a Party or a dispute between the Parties, an issue 
arises as to whether a measure of  a Party is a 
taxation measure, a Party may refer the issue to the 
taxation authorities of  the Parties. A decision of  the 
taxation authorities shall bind a Tribunal formed 
pursuant to Section C (Settlement of  Disputes 
between an Investor and the Host Party) or arbitral 
panel formed pursuant to Section D (State-to-State 
Dispute Settlement Procedures). A Tribunal or 
arbitral panel seized of  a claim or a dispute in which 
the issue arises may not proceed until it receives the 
decision of  the taxation authorities. If  the taxation 
authorities have not decided the issue within six 
months of  the referral, the Tribunal or arbitral 
panel shall decide the issue. […]’71
Similar provisions exist in the US Model BIT,72 in 
CETA,73 and in a number of  other recent IIAs.74 It 
would also be possible to provide a filter mechanism 
with respect to other exceptions. The Korea-Vietnam 
FTA provides that ‘[i]f  the disputing Party asserts as a 
defense that the measure alleged to be a breach is wi-
thin the scope of  a reservation or exception set out in 
Annex I or II,75 the Tribunal shall, upon request of  that 
disputing Party, request the Joint Committee to inter-
pret the issue.’76 If  after 60 days the Joint Committee 
has failed to produce an interpretation, the issue shall 
revert to the tribunal for determination.77 
4. dIspute preventIon: focAl poInts or 
ombudsmen
Dispute prevention policies (DPPs) aim to minimise 
the number of  conflicts that escalate into formal dispu-
tes.78 Dispute prevention can require the establishment of  
71  Article 14(6) and (7) of  the Canadian Model BIT (version of  
2012).
72  Article 21 of  the US Model BIT (2012).
73  Article 28.7(7) of  CETA.
74  E.g. Article 22 of  the Japan-Kazakhstan BIT (2014); Article 25 
of  the Japan-Uruguay BIT (2015); Article 14 of  the Burkina Faso-
Canada BIT; Article 14 of  the Canada-Hong Kong BIT; Article 21 
of  the Canada-Mongolia BIT.
75  It has not been possible to identify Annex I and II of  the Ko-
rea-Vietnam FTA to identify the exceptions to which this provision 
makes reference. Chapters contain annexes numbered with Arabic 
(rather than Latin) numerals, e.g. at the end of  the FTA’s investment 
chapter (Chapter 9) annexes are numbered in the following manner: 
Annex 9-A, Annex 9-B, etc.
76  Art 9.24(2) of  the Korea-Vietnam FTA.
77  Art 9.24(2) of  the Korea-Vietnam FTA.
78 UNCTAD, Investor–State Disputes: Prevention and Alterna-
tives to Arbitration, UNCTAD Series on International Investment 
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institutional structures,79 it can be pursued unilaterally but 
also bilaterally, and it can involve cooperation between the 
contracting parties. The present section explores a parti-
cular dispute prevention method that has been inserted in 
the new Brazilian cooperation and facilitation investment 
agreements (CFIAs), ombudsmen or focal points.80
The Brazilian government, averse to investor-state arbi-
tration, has focused on DPPs and alternative dispute reso-
lution (ADR).81 The Brazilian model favours mechanisms 
that aim to prevent disputes on the basis of  dialogue and 
bilateral consultation; if  these fail, the parties can submit 
the dispute to state-state arbitration.82 Initially, dispute pre-
vention was one of  the model’s three pillars.83 In its current 
form, Part III of  the model is dedicated to ‘Institutional 
Governance and Dispute Prevention’. Article 22 is enti-
rely focused on dispute prevention. Dispute prevention is 
made possible through two institutions: a joint committee 
and national focal points or ombudsmen.
National focal points are designated by each party.84 
In Brazil, they are established within the Chamber of  
Foreign Trade (CAMEX),85 the Council of  Ministers of  
the Brazilian Chamber of  Commerce, an inter-ministerial 
body for foreign trade, presided by the Minister of  Deve-
lopment, Industry and Foreign Trade.86 Their main task is 
to assist investors from the other party in their territory.87 
Their role is then one of  dispute prevention as it is one 
of  investment promotion and facilitation. Concretely, 
their responsibilities include: endeavouring to follow the 
recommendations of  the Joint Committee and interact 
with their counterpart in the other contracting party; 
following up on requests and enquiries of  the other party 
or of  investors of  the other party with the competent 
authorities; assessing, in consultation with relevant public 
authorities, suggestions and complaints of  the other par-
Policies for Development, 2010, New York, Geneva, UN, p. xiv.
79 Ibid., p. xiv.
80  The terms ‘ombudsman’ and ‘focal point’ are used inter-
changeably in the article as synonymous.
81  The term ADR is used here to signify ‘alternative to ISDS’. See 
in general on this issue Catharine Titi, International Investment Law 
and the Protection of  Foreign Investment in Brazil, Transnational 
Dispute Management 2, 2016, Special Issue on Latin America vol. 1 
(eds Ignacio Torterola and Quinn Smith).
82  Ibid., p. 9.
83  Ibid., p. 9.
84  Article 17(1) of  the Brazilian Model CFIA of  3 March 2016 
(version 2.3.1) (hereinafter Brazilian Model CFIA).
85  Article 17(2) of  the Brazilian Model CFIA.
86  CAMEX’s functions are established by Decree n. 4.732/2003. 
87  Article 17(1) of  the Brazilian Model CFIA.
ty or investors of  the other party and recommending ac-
tions to improve the investment environment; seeking to 
prevent disputes in investment matters, in collaboration 
with public authorities and relevant private entities; and 
providing information on regulatory issues.88 The con-
tracting parties shall use the focal points, and the Joint 
Committee, to exchange information on business oppor-
tunities, procedures and requirements for investment.89 
The focal points ‘shall promptly reply to notifications 
and requests’ by the other party or its investors,90 and 
they ‘shall act in coordination with each other and with 
the Joint Committee in order to prevent, manage and re-
solve any disputes between the Parties’.91 Although the 
model CFIA provides for state-state dispute settlement,92 
this does not become available until the dispute has beco-
me ‘the object of  consultations and negotiations between 
the Parties’ and has been examined by the Joint Com-
mittee.93 The exact role of  the focal points is not entirely 
clear in this description but in the procedure that follows 
the Joint Committee has the leading role.94
The Brazilian model’s national focal points or ombu-
dsmen are inspired by the Korean Office of  the Foreign 
Investment Ombudsman. The Foreign Investment Om-
budsman was first introduced in 1999 to resolve grie-
vances of  foreign investors operating in Korea.95 The 
Office of  the Foreign Investment Ombudsman collects 
information about the problems experienced by foreign 
investors, it liaises with relevant administrative agencies, 
it proposes policies to improve investment promotion 
and assist foreign investors in ‘solving their grievances’.96 
Besides Korea’s investment ombudsman system, other 
countries have established investment ombudsmen, in-
cluding Georgia,97 Greece,98 Japan,99 the Philippines,100 
88  Article 17(4) of  the Brazilian Model CFIA.
89  Article 18(1) of  the Brazilian Model CFIA.
90  Article 17(6) of  the Brazilian Model CFIA.
91  Article 22(1) of  the Brazilian Model CFIA.
92  Article 23 of  the Brazilian Model CFIA. See further e.g. Article 
15 of  the Brazil-Mozambique CFIA; Article 15 the Brazil-Angola 
CFIA; Article 13(6) of  the Brazil-Malawi CFIA.
93  Article 22(2) of  the Brazilian Model CFIA.
94  Especially Article 22(3) of  the Brazilian Model CFIA.
95  See http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/au/poelb.do. 
96  See http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/au/poelb.do. 
97  See http://businessombudsman.ge/en. 
98  See http://www.enterprisegreece.gov.gr/en/about-us-/pro-
file. 
99  See http://www.invest-japan.go.jp/contact/en_index.html. 
100  See http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/docs/investmentOm-
budsman/investmentomb.pdf. 
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and the United States.101 These systems are generally to 
be distinguished from the focal points in the Brazilian 
model inasmuch as they are mechanisms established uni-
laterally by a country without reciprocity. At the same 
time, these mechanisms do not replace investor-state dis-
pute settlement but are complementary to it.
The Brazilian model’s national focal points are redo-
lent of  another mechanism, the national contact points 
(NCPs) for the Guidelines for Multinational Enterpri-
ses of  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). The OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises contain recommendations for 
responsible business conduct that adhering governments 
encourage their enterprises to respect wherever they ope-
rate.102 The national contact points are agencies establi-
shed by the governments to facilitate implementation of  
the OECD Guidelines, and provide a mediation and con-
ciliation platform for resolving related practical issues.103 
They are not established to protect or assist investors but 
to ensure that the latter observe the OECD Guidelines.
CETA has also set in place contact points, whose 
role is different yet. CETA contact points are establi-
shed under Article 26.5. According to this article, their 
task comprises, among others, monitoring the work of  
CETA’s institutional bodies, following up on the deci-
sions made by the CETA Joint Committee, and facili-
tating communications between the contracting parties 
on any matter covered by the agreement.104
5. conclusIon
State-state procedures in investment dispute settle-
ment and dispute prevention continue to attract attention. 
This short contribution has examined three specific ‘soft’ 
or non-adjudicatory state-to-state procedures in dispute 
prevention and dispute resolution. The article discussed 
interpretive statements issued jointly by the contracting 
parties and noted that general public international law 
recognises subsequent agreement or practice of  the con-
tracting parties as an authoritative means of  treaty inter-
pretation. Joint treaty interpretations are also possible on 
101  See https://www.selectusa.gov/welcome. 
102  See http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/oecdguidelines-
formultinationalenterprises.htm. 
103  See http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/ncps.htm. 
104  Article 26.5(2) of  CETA.
the basis of  treaty articles that expressly establish proce-
dures for binding interpretive statements, such as Article 
1131 of  NAFTA, but also on the basis of  other means, 
such as through joint submissions in an ongoing dispute. 
The article also briefly considered clarifications through 
diplomatic notes and periodic review of  treaty content. 
Subsequently, the discussion turned to filter mechanisms, 
that allow the relevant tax or financial authorities or the 
parties to determine jointly whether a contested measure 
falls within the scope of  a defence that the respondent 
invokes. Filters appear to increase in popularity and have 
been refined in recent investment treatymaking. Finally, 
focal points or ombudsmen were considered on the basis 
of  the Brazilian Model CFIA. Focal points or ombuds-
men can function as an effective dispute prevention – but 
also investment promotion and facilitation – mechanism. 
A challenge that remains with respect to Brazilian CFIAs 
is that at the moment of  writing these treaties have not 
yet been ratified.105 The mechanism however is interes-
ting and could be emulated in other investment treaties. 
But caution is also necessary. The mechanisms canvassed 
in this article entail, by definition, a partial politicisation 
of  investment disputes. Such politicisation may be more 
obvious when the state parties have a direct involvement 
in a dispute, such as in the case of  joint interpretive state-
ments or in the case of  filter mechanisms that route the 
dispute to state-state arbitration. But it is also present in 
other contexts. Notice for instance that the Brazilian mo-
del CFIA’s focal points are established within CAMEX, 
itself  a political body. This does not mean that the pro-
posed mechanisms are not appropriate, but rather that a 
critical approach vis-à-vis their role and functioning and 
further study are necessary going forward.
references
Articles & book chapters
Emmanuel Gaillard, Investment treaty arbitration and 
jurisdiction over contract claims—the SGS cases con-
105  However, Brazil’s CFIAs with Mexico and Peru are said to 
have obtained congressional approval. See José Henrique Vieira 
Martins, Brazil’s Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agree-
ments (CFIA) and Recent Developments, Investment Treaty News, 12 
June 2017, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/brazils-coopera-
tion-facilitation-investment-agreements-cfia-recent-developments-
jose-henrique-vieira-martins/.
TI
TI
, C
at
ha
rin
e. 
N
on
-a
dj
ud
ica
to
ry
 S
ta
te
-S
ta
te
 M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s i
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
isp
ut
e 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n 
an
d 
D
isp
ut
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t: 
Jo
in
t I
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
ns
, F
ilt
er
s a
nd
 F
oc
al 
Po
in
ts.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
14
, n
. 2
, 2
01
7 
p.
 3
6-
48
48
sidered’ in Todd Weiler (ed.), International Investment Law 
and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, 
Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, 2005
Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, and Jesse Coleman, Inter-
national Investment Agreements, 2014: A Review of  
Trends and New Approaches, in Andrea Bjorklund 
(ed.) Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 
2014-2015, 2016
Lars Markert and Catharine Titi, States Strike Back – 
Old and New ways for Host States to Defend against 
Investment Arbitrations, in Andrea Bjorklund (ed.), Ye-
arbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2013-2014, 
2015, OUP
Catharine Titi, International Investment Law and the 
Protection of  Foreign Investment in Brazil, Transnatio-
nal Dispute Management 2, 2016, Special Issue on Latin 
America vol. 1 (eds Ignacio Torterola and Quinn Smith)
Catharine Titi, Are Investment Tribunals Adjudicating 
Political Disputes? Some reflections on the repoliticiza-
tion of  investment disputes and (new) forms of  diploma-
tic protection, Journal of International Arbitration 32 (3), 2015
José Henrique Vieira Martins, Brazil’s Cooperation and 
Facilitation Investment Agreements (CFIA) and Recent 
Developments, Investment Treaty News, 12 June 2017, 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/brazils-coope-
ration-facilitation-investment-agreements-cfia-recent-
developments-jose-henrique-vieira-martins/
Reports
ILC, Report of  the International Law Commission, 
Sixty-fifth session (6 May–7 June and 8 July–9 August 
2013), UN Doc A/68/10 (2013)
ILC, Yearbook of  the International Law Commission 1966, 
Vol. II 221, [14], UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l
Andrew Lang and Caitlin Conyers, Financial Ser-
vices in EU Trade Agreements, Study for the Eu-
ropean Parliament, 2014, http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/536300/
IPOL_STU(2014)536300_EN.pdf
NAFTA, Free Trade Commission Clarifications Related 
to NAFTA Chapter 11, 31 July 2001
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming Inter-
national Investment Governance, 2015, New York and Ge-
neva, UN
UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note No. 3: Interpretation of  IIAs: 
What States Can Do, 2011
UNCTAD, Investor–State Disputes: Prevention and 
Alternatives to Arbitration, UNCTAD Series on Inter-
national Investment Policies for Development, 2010, 
New York, Geneva: UN
Cases
ICJ/PCIJ
Delimitation of  the Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier 
(Question of  Jaworzina), Advisory Opinion, (1923) 
PCIJ Series B no 8
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judg-
ment, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 1045
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. 
Kenya), Judgment, 2 February 2017
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (In-
donesialMalaysia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 625
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judg-
ment, ICJ Reports 1994, p. 6 
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zea-
land intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2014, p. 226
Investment tribunals
CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v the 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14 March 
2003
Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v Guatema-
la, ICSID Case No ARB/07/23, Award, 29 June 2012
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, 
ICSID Case No ARB/01/13, Decision on Objection to 
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003
Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004
